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CASENOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SCOPE OF A WARRANTLESS AU-
TOMOBILE SEARCH EXTENDS TO CLOSED CONTAINERS 
AND IS AS BROAD AS A MAGISTRATE COULD AUTHORIZE 
IN A WARRANT. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
During the course of a warrantless search of the defendant's auto-
mobile a paper bag found in the trunk was seized and examined by the 
police. The paper bag contained a quantity of glassine bags holding a 
substance later identified as heroin. The defendant's automobile was 
then driven to police headquarters where a second warrantless search 
of the trunk produced a closed leather pouch containing $3,200.00. 
The defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless 
searches was denied, and the heroin and currency were both admitted 
into evidence at trial. The defendant appealed his subsequent convic-
tion to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
where the case was initially heard by a three-judge panel and then by 
the court en banco I The court of appeals held that the searches of the 
paper bag and pouch were unlawful and reversed the trial court.2 A 
writ of certiorari was granted3 by the Supreme Court which held that if 
a police officer has probable cause to search a lawfully stopped vehicle 
pursuant to the automobile exception to the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement,4 then the search may encompass any part of the vehi-
cle or its compartments, including any closed containers which may 
conceal the object of the search. The scope of a warrantless automobile 
exception search was held to be as broad as that which a magistrate can 
authorize in a warrant. 5 
The fourth amendment to the Constitution,6 which has been held 
1. United States V. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 
2157 (1982). 
2. 655 F.2d at 1171. 
3. United States V. Ross, 454 U.S. 891 (1981). 
4. The automobile exception to the general warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution upholds warrantless vehicle searches when prob-
able cause exists to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and when 
exigent circumstances are present. See Chambers V. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,51-52 
(1970); Carroll V. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925). For a thorough 
discussion of the automobile exception see C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE §§ 7.01-.06 (1980 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as WHITEBREAD]; Moy-
lan, The Automobile Exception: What it is and What it is not - A Rationale in 
Search 0/ a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Moylan]; Comment, The Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amend-
ment Principles, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933 (1980); Comment, The Automobile 
Exception To The Warrant Requirement: Speeding Away from the Fourth Amend-
ment, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 637 (1980). 
5. United States V. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
6. The fourth amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
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applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,? general-
ly requires searches and seizures by government officials to be made 
pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.8 
Searches made without a warrant are considered to be unreasonable 
per se, although a "few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions" exist.9 The automobile exception is one of the few judicially 
recognized exceptions; 10 its purpose is to allow warrantless vehicle 
searches under certain circumstances. 11 
The automobile exception originated in the landmark case of Car-
roll v. United States. 12 In Carroll, a Prohibition era case, government 
agents had probable cause to believe the defendants were transporting 
illegal liquor in their automobile. The government agents stopped the 
defendants as they were driving their vehicle and conducted a warrant-
less search, finding 68 bottles of contraband liquor hidden in the uphol-
stery of the car seats. As a result, the defendants were convicted of 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). In Mapp, the Court held that the 
exclusionary rule is binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. The 
exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy which prohibits the use of evidence at trial 
if it was unlawfully seized by government officials in violation of the fourth 
amendment. ld at 655-56. 
8. The warrant requirement is considered a protection against governmental intru-
sions because it substitutes the reasoning of a "neutral and detached magistrate" 
in making the determination of whether probable cause exists to search and seize 
for that of a police officer, who is "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (foot-
note omitted) (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 454, 464 (1932». The 
requirement of prior review limits the power of the executive branch over the 
individual, in some cases preventing unjustified searches from taking place. See 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); Abel v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 252 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally 
Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350-54 (1972) (discussing the "neutral and de-
tached" requirement). 
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted) (citing Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925); McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-77 (1949); 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
300 (1967»; see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) (the Court 
placed the burden on the prosecution to show a need for an exemption from 
the warrant requirement), rejected in pari, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 
(1982). 
10. In addition to the "automobile exception". there are at least five other recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement: (I) search conducted incident to a lawful 
arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969); (2) emergency situations, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); (3) 
stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); (4) hot pursuit, Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); and (5) plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971). 
11. See supra note 4. 
12. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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violating the National Prohibition Act. 13 
On appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with the issues of 
whether the fourth amendment protected vehicles as well as fixed struc-
tures, and if a vehicle was so protected whether a warrantless search of 
it was permissible. 14 The Court readily found that the fourth amend-
ment applied to automobiles; 15 however, it also recognized that an in-
herent mobility in vehicles distinguishes them from fixed premises. 16 
The Court then held that if probable cause exists l7 to believe the auto-
mobile is transporting evidence of a crime, practical considerations jus-
tify a warrantless search of the vehicle. 18 The Court had few occasions 
to examine the Carroll doctrine until 1970, 19 when renewed interest de-
veloped in it. 20 That year, the Court decided Chambers v. Maroney, 21 
and expanded the automobile exception by upholding a warrantless ve-
hicle search conducted after the vehicle had been seized and towed to a 
police station.22 The actual mobility of the vehicle was nonexistent at 
13. Id at 134-36. 
14. Id at 134, 153. 
15. Id at 153. 
16.ld at 151. The Court arrived at the distinction between fixed premises and vehi-
cles through historical analysis, reasoning that the distinction was recognized 
when the fourth amendment was adopted. Id 
17. The Court recognized that probable cause had been defined in various ways, 
before holding that it exists when "the facts and circumstances within [the police 
officer's) knowledge and of which [he) had reasonably trustworthy information 
[are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
... " that objects subject to seizure may be found at the locus of the search. Id at 
162. See generally WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, §§ 3.03, 5.03. Thus, probable 
cause is determined by subjective inferences based upon objective criteria. How-
ever, within the context of the automobile exception, probable cause is determined 
by the police officer rather than a neutral magistrate. 
18. United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). The Court reasoned that the 
inherent mobility of an automobile justifies an immediate intrusion before the 
contraband can be transported out of the jurisdiction. Id Another justification is 
the lack of an opportunity to obtain a warrant since the vehicle is usually encoun-
tered unexpectedly. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, § 7.04 at 117; Moylan, supra 
note 4, at 993, 1004-09. 
19. From the time Carroll was decided in 1925 until 1970 the automobile exception 
was examined only three times by the Supreme Court. See Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); see also United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 
(1927) (applying the Carroll doctrine to a boat search). 
20. One commentator has suggested that between 1925 and 1970, warrantless vehicle 
searches were generally included in the search incident to an arrest exception. 
However, the search incident exception was sharply curtailed in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See Moylan, supra note 4, at 987, 1000-01. Thus, 
after Chimel there was a resurgence in the use of the automobile exception termi-
nology. Id 
21. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
22. Id at 52. The Court held that there was no constitutional distinction between 
seizing a vehicle until a warrant could be obtained and conducting an immediate 
search. Therefore, since probable cause and mobility were present at the initial 
stop both still existed at the stationhouse a short time later. Id at 51-52. The 
Chambers decision 9as been criticised for allowing the warrantless search to take 
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the time of the search. Subsequent cases have justified the Chambers 
search in retrospect, not on the grounds of exigency but rather due to 
the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile.23 However, 
while the Court has accepted warrantless vehicle searches as reasonable 
in certain instances, it has carefully stressed that a search warrant will 
be required when possible.24 
Although the Court has recognized the automobile exception for 
over fifty years, confusion has existed concerning the permissible scope 
of warrantless vehicle searches. The confusion has been caused in a 
large part by attempts to extend the inherently mobile justification to 
nonvehicle searches.25 In United States v. Chadwick 26 the government 
sought to uphold a warrantless search of a locked footlocker which had 
been removed from the trunk of a parked vehicle moments after the 
defendants had loaded it into the vehicle. The government pursued 
two theories of reasoning. First, it argued that the footlocker was not 
subject to fourth amendment protection.27 Alternatively, the govern-
ment claimed that if the footlocker was within the ambit of the fourth 
amendment, the automobile exception should apply by analogy.28 The 
Court rejected both contentions and held that the fourth amendment 
protects all areas where an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
place when there appeared to be no actual exigency present. See Comment, The 
AUlomobile Exceplion: A Conlradiclion in Fourlh Amendment Principles, 17 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 933, 938-41 (1980); Comment, Mislaling The Exigency Rule: The 
Supreme Courl v. The Exigency Requiremenl in Warranlless AUlomobile Searches, 
28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 981, 992-93 (1977); Comment, The A ulomobile Exceplion To 
The Warranl Requirement: Speeding Away from Ihe Fourth Amendment, 82 W. 
VA. L. REV. 637, 643-45 (1980). BUI if. Moylan, supra note 4, at 1002-04 (the 
Chambers decision may be read as allowing searches at the police station if it is 
not safe or prudent to conduct an immediate search at the scene of the initial 
stop). 
23. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12-13 (1977) (justifying Chambers on 
the basis of a diminished expectation of privacy rationale); Texas v. White, 423 
U.S. 67, 67-68 (1977) (per curiam) (application of Chambers rationale to uphold 
vehicle search). The diminished expectation of privacy exists because: (I) a vehi-
cle serves as a means of transportation and seldom serves as a residence or a 
repository of personal effects; (2) a vehicle travels on public thoroughfares subject-
ing its occupants and contents to plain view; (3) vehicles and their operators are 
subject to registration and licensing; (4) extensive regulation exists as to the opera-
tion of vehicles; (5) vehicles are often subject to periodic inspections; and (6) vehi-
cles may be taken into police custody in the interests of public safety. United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2163-64 (1982); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). 
25. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (search of a suitcase taken 
from the trunk of a taxicab held invalid as the police officers had control of the 
luggage and there was no exigency) rejected in part, United States v. Ross, 102 S. 
Ct. 2157 (1982); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977) (search of a foot-
locker invalid since the probable cause went not to the vehicle, but to the footlock-
er which had been put in the vehicle's trunk moments prior to being seized). 
26. 433 U.S. I (1977). 
27. /d. at 6-7. 
28. /d. at 11-12. 
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privacy.29 The Court then concluded that, unlike an automobile, lug-
gage did not allow a finding of a lesser expectation of privacy.3o The 
Court also found that there was no exigency present, as the locker was 
under the control of the government agents who could have held it 
until a search warrant was obtained.31 
Following Chadwick, the Court decided Arkansas v. Sanders. 32 In 
Sanders, government agents acting on probable cause observed the de-
fendant place a suitcase, believed to contain narcotics, in the trunk of a 
vehicle. The agents then allowed the vehicle to be driven several 
blocks before they stopped it. After stopping the vehicle the agents 
seized the luggage and conducted a warrantless search, finding contra-
band.33 As in Chadwick, the Court held that once the luggage was 
seized the exigenc~ disappeared and the agents were required to obtain 
a search warrant. 4 The Court expressly refused to apply the Carroll 
doctrine and held that the fourth amendment applied to the luggage 
taken from a vehicle to the same extent it applied to luggage found in 
some other location.35 
Although Sanders is more analogous to Chadwick than it is to Car-
roll 36 it nevertheless restricted the automobile exception and paved the 
way for Robbins v. California. 37 In Robbins, a plurality opinion, the 
Court refused to distinguish searches of containers based on the nature 
of their physical characteristics.38 In Robbins the defendant was 
stopped by police officers who observed him driving a station wagon in 
an erratic manner. The police officers observed the defendant fumble 
with his wallet as he attempted to find his driver's license and vehicle 
registration card and smelled the odor of marihuana coming from the 
interior of the car. A search of the passenger compartment produced 
29. Jd. at 7-8,12-13. 
30. Id. at 12-13. See supra note 23 for a discussion of why there is a diminished 
expectation of privacy associated with automobiles. 
31. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977). 
32. 442 U.S. 753 (1979) rejected in part, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
33. 442 U.S. at 755. 
34. Jd. at 765-66. 
35. Jd. at 766. 
36. The focus of the search in Sanders was on a specific piece of luggage which was 
suspected of containing contraband, as opposed to Carroll where there was prob-
able cause to believe the vehicle was transporting contraband. 
37. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (a plurality opinion consisting of Justices Stewart, Brennan, 
White, and Marshall), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
38. 453 U.S. at 425-26. The argument was advanced by the government that the level 
of an individual's expectation of privacy turned on the type of container being 
searched. The government argued that the nature of the container should deter-
mine the level of fourth amendment protection; that only containers of a type· 
used to carry personal effects should receive full protection. The plurality rejected 
the government's argument on two groundS. First, the fourth amendment protects 
people and their personal, and impersonal, effects. Second, a distinction based 
upon a worthy or less worthy standard would be impossible to apply. Id. at 425-
27. A search would be permitted, however, if the container's outward appearance, 
like a gun case, conveyed the nature of its contents. Id at 427. 
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marihuana and paraphernalia for using it. The defendant was then ar-
rested and a further search of the rear compartment of the vehicle was 
conducted, where the officer found two packages wrapped in a green, 
opaque plastic materia1.39 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for 
the purpose of dissipating the uncertainty over whether closed contain-
ers found during a lawful, but warrantless, vehicle search could them-
selves be searched without a warrant.40 The plurality held that any 
container found during a lawful vehicle search could not be searched 
without first obtaining a warrant.41 
In United States v. Ross,42 the Court has reversed its position in 
Robbins and rejected a portion of the Sanders rationale.43 In its deci-
sion, the Court reviewed the Carroll doctrine and found warrantless 
vehicle searches to be reasonable when they are based upon objective 
facts capable of supporting a warrant.44 The Court then examined 
Chadwick and Sanders, distinguishing them from true warrantless ve-
hicle searches on the grounds that the probable cause in both focused 
upon a particular container rather than the automobile.45 Robbins was 
distinguished by noting that the precise issue concerning the scope of a 
lawful, warrantless vehicle search had not been before the Court.46 Re-
turning to Carroll and its progeny, the Court found it persuasive that 
nowhere had it been alleged or even suggested that searches of contain-
ers found during an automobile exception search required a warrant.47 
The majority then appraised practical considerations, noting that a 
criminal rarely leaves his contraband in plain view or strewn about the 
trunk of the vehicle. Thus, the Court concluded that Carroll would 
largely be nullified if the scope of a warrantless vehicle search did not 
extend to containers. Next, the majority analogized the scope of 
searches made pursuant to a search warrant and searches made without 
warrants. The scope was reasoned to be the same once the right to 
conduct the search was established.48 
The majority acknowledged that there are privacy interests associ-
ated with closed containers which invoke fourth amendment rights and 
protections.49 However, the majority also recognized that the extent of 
the privacy interest in a container, and hence the amount of fourth 
39. Id at 422. 
40. Id at 423. 
41. Id at 428-29. For a critical analysis of the Court's opinion in Robbins, see Com-
ment, Fourth Amendment-Of Cars, Containers, and Confusion, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1981). 
42. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
43. Id at 2172. 
44.ld 
45. Id at 2166-67. 
46. Id at 2168. 
47. Id at 2169. 
48. The only difference between the two is that the prior probable cause determina-
tion is made by a magistrate in search warrant cases. 
49.ld at 2171. 
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amendment protection, varied in different factual settings. 50 Therefore, 
even if a privacy interest exists in a vehicle or its contents, it must suc-
cumb to a reasonable search when there is probable cause to believe 
the vehicle is being used to transport contraband.51 The Court con-
cluded by holding that when probable cause exists, the scope of the 
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle is as broad as that which a magis-
trate can authorize in a warrant; such a search extends to all parts of 
the vehicle, including containers therein that are capable of concealing 
the object of the search. 52 
Ross appears to be an effort by the Court to produce yet another 
"bright-line" rule to aid law enforcement officials in their duties. 53 Al-
though it is doubtful that Ross stands for the demise of the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement, as was proclaimed in the dissenting 
opinion, 54 it is subject to several criticisms. First, Ross appears to de-
lineate a rule which furthers prompt and efficient law enforcement at 
the expense of fourth amendment rights and protections. 55 Second, 
Ross explicitly retained a portion of the rationale set forth in Sanders 
and it is, therefore, highly probable that litigation in the area of auto-
mobile searches will continue. 56 Third, the traditional rationale which 
supports warrantless vehicle searches does not apply to containers 
which are easily seized and can be held while a magistrate makes a 
probable cause determination. 57 Finally, it has been forecast by com-
mentators that Ross may provide a stepping stone which will lead to 
allowing the search of any moveable container found in a public place 
on the same grounds which validate warrantless vehicle searches. 58 
50. Id The Court cited the right to search a container of an individual entering the 
country, pursuant to an arrest without a warrant, and pursuant to a search war-
rant. In all three situations the privacy interest must yield to the authority to 
search. Id 
51. Id at 2170-71. 
52.ld at 2172. The language that the search is limited to containers which "may 
conceal the object of the search" appears to be the only limitation upon the scope 
of the search. For example, probable cause to search for a lawnmower in a garage 
does not justify the search of an upstairs bedroom. Id 
53. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (establishing a "bright-line" 
rule in the context of searches incident to the arrests of recent occupants of an 
automobile). See generally, LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Impeifect 
World' On Drawing "Bright-lines" and "Good faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307 
( 1982). 
54. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173 (1982) (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., 
dissenting). 
55. Ross substitutes a probable cause determination made by a police officer for that 
of a magistrate, as required in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
56. In the future, however, the focus of the courts will be on whether the officer's 
probable cause was directed towards the vehicle or towards a particular container' 
only casually connected with a vehicle. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 
(1982) (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., dissenting). 
57.ld at 2176. 
58. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 34-35; see also address by Professor Y. 
Kamisar, Fourth Annual Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law Sympo-
sium (September 24-25, 1982), reprinted in 32 CRIM. L. REPTR. 2057-58 (1982). 
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Despite the criticisms of Ross, two developments to the automo-
bile exception doctrine have resulted from the decision. First, Ross 
serves to clarify the scope of automobile searches, an area of law which 
had become confused due to the incorporation of "container-type" 
cases into one of the oldest exceptions to the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement. Second, by eliminating this confusion, Ross has re-
versed a trend of case law which had severely restricted the practical 
utility of the automobile ·exception. However, as a caveat, it remains to 
be seen whether the rationale supporting the clarification will be ex-
tended into nonautomobile searches. 
Ronald W. Slonaker 
